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He who turns the pages of reports and digests under the title
"double jeopardy", although he barely scratches the surface of
the prodigious record of successful and unsuccessful prosecu-
tions, gets, nevertheless, even in an afternoon's casual reading,
some very strong impressions as to the manner in which lawyers
and judges have performed their task of ascertaining, declaring
and applying the rules and principles of criminal law. He will
most probably depart with an uneasy feeling that the law itself,-
meaning thereby the decided cases, is in no small measure re-
sponsible for the menace of unmanageable criminality which
now confronts the people of the United States.
Pick out one hundred cases from the record of criminal ap-
peals, wherein judgments of conviction have been set aside, taking
care that they extend backward over the last one hundred years,
and assume them to be fairly representative of the whole body
of decisions. You will find that with some exceptions here and
there, their net result has been not to protect the innocent but
to accomplish the escape of the guilty. By the word "innocent"
is not meant that technical precept of Anglo-Saxon legal philos-
ophy, that every man is innocent until he has been convicted of
guilt in strict accord with every minute detail of legal procedure.
Rather this is meant, that when a man, in the settled opinion of
all who know the facts, has burned the house of his neighbor, or
assaulted and robbed a fellow traveller, or battered out the
life of one whom he hates or fears; and that man goes free, or
wanting freedom, succeeds in dragging out the inquest of his
crime through long, successive, and exhausting trials, appeals
and retrials, because of haunting fear of a long-past tyranny
or slavish devotion to worn out dogmas, then the net result of all
the labors of lawyers and judges in that case is not to protect
the innocent, but rather to secure or, at least, to offer hope of
immunity to the guilty.
Viewed historically, much of the criminal litigation in this
country in the last hundred years, is a ridiculous anachronism.
Time was, in the development of the English law, when judges
had before them over and over again the innocent victims of a
savage code and an unconscionable abuse of power. From the
circumstances of such cases, they sought to evolve rules which
would thwart the instant outrage, and discourage its repetition
in the future. But so far has that savagery spent itself, so com-
pletely has the abuse of criminal procedure disappeared in the
vast improvement of social and economic conditions, that seldom,
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if ever, are those rules evoked in modern times except to defeat
what, in common understanding, would be called the ends of
justice. And this would seem to be what Justice Holmes had
in mind in a dissenting opinion delivered in 1904, when he said,
"At the present time in this country, there is more danger that
criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjeeted to
tyranny." I
Some centuries ago, in the time of Lord Hale, let us say, a poor
wretch was dragged into court and charged with crime. So
vague and uncertain was the proof that judge and prosecutor,
despairing of their prey, dismissed the jury and started again;
and so on, till a conviction was assured. Finally, such a case
came before a judge of nobler feeling, who found in that out-
rageous practice full warrant for the proposition that the a2cused
in the first trial had been once in jeopardy; that he ,.as entitled
to plead that jeopardy in bar of the second trial; and that upon
such a plea he must be acquitted. And few fail to do honor to
the men who thus served the cause of justice.
But less than forty years ago, in Pennsylvania, an accused
was put to trial upon the charge of murder. The jury went
out, and after five days of deliberation, the term having come
to an end, were discharged for failure to agree. At the next
term, the accused was again put to trial upon the same charge,
and he pleaded the selfsame plea of "double jeopardy". The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania solemnly concluded that the de-
fense was letter perfect and that the accused must be discharged.
It does not seem to lessen the rebuke to the majesty of the law
that the pages of this opinion were figuratively blotted with
tears of judicial regret for a conclusion so monstrous. And as
far as can be determined, this case still states the law of Penn-
sylvania on this particular branch of the subject of "double
jeopardy".
What is this "double jeopardy"? The Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States contains this quaint relic
of mediaeval jargon:
"Nor shall any person be subject for the came offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
To find out what it means, one must go back to Blaclstone,
and so on through the dusty past to Lord Hale. He must treat
it as a masterpiece of literary elision, and must conclude, as our
American Courts have since concluded, that to the old English
mind a man must indeed be said to be in jeopardy of life or limb
whenever he was brought into a court of justice and charged
with the commission of a crime. And so to-day in American law,
it means that a man may not be brought to trial in a new and
independent case when he has already been tried once for the
same offense, notwithstanding he may never, either in the first
1 Kepner v. United States (1904) 195 U. S. 100, 134, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 80G.
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trial or in the second, have been in any jeopardy either of his
life or any of his limbs, which rather delicate problem of liberal
construction was thus expounded in an early New York case :-"
"The expression 'jeopardy of limb' was used in reference to
the nature of the offense and not to designate the punishment for
an offense; for no such punishment as loss of limb was inflicted
by the laws of any of the states at the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. Punishment by deprivation of the limbs of the offender
would be abhorrent to the feelings and opinions of the enlightened
age in which the Constitution was adopted and it had grown into
disuse in England for a long period antecedently. We must
understand the term 'jeopardy of limb' as referring to offenses
which in former ages were punished by dismemberment and as
intending to comprise crimes denominafed in the law as felonies."
This provision, as a matter of Constitutional limitation, does
not, of course, apply to the States. Connecticut has no such
provision in her Constitution. The principle, however, is re-
garded as one well established in the common law and applicable
in all its vagaries to the administration of criminal law in this
State. But to the honor of the judiciary of Connecticut, it ought
to be added that they have been very intolerant of some of the
extravagance which, in other States, has been solemnized as law.
Thus, in State v. Woodruff,3 they refused to accede to the
proposition that there could be no second trial after a jury in the
first trial, having disagreed, had been discharged. True it is,
that in reaching that decision, they were obliged to treat lightly
the obstacles which were confidently expected to block the path
of justice. But the result was good, and it was final.
Again in 1893, in, State v. Lee,4 Judge Hammersley divested
this ancient phantom of more of its venerable vestments. It has
from earliest times been an established rule in American criminal
law that the State could not by writ of error secure a new trial.
And this was supposed to be a necessary consequence of the rule
against double jeopardy. But here again we have an instance of
judicial prejudice based upon one consideration, fastening upon
a wholly unrelated rule to furnish forth a seeming support from
ancient precedents. One might argue that it is against public
policy to subject a man who has been accused of crime to the ex-
pense and burden of an appeal and the possibility of a new trial.
But such argument is not without its flaws and imperfections.
Thus from early times the dicta of Lord Hale and others that a
criminal cause once submitted to a jury cannot be submitted to
another jury has been repudiated under the guise of exceptions
in many instances. It has been ruled that the jeopardy is not
exhausted by an indictment followed by a nolle; nor by the dis-
charge of a jury in case of sickness of a judge; nor even the case
2 People v. Goodwin (1820, N. Y.) 18 Johns. 187, 201.
3 (1807, Conn.) 2 Day, 504.
4 (1894) 65 Conn. 265, 30 AtI. 1110.
FORMER JEOPARDY
of sickness of a juror; nor the sickness of the prisoner; nor in
case of the expiration of the term of Court during the progress
of the trial; nor in the case of the inability of the jury to agree;
nor in the case of influence exerted on the jury against the prose-
cution by an officer in charge of the jury; nor in the case of mis-
conduct or incapacity of a juror even after the case has been
committed to the jury; nor is it exhausted by an acquittal when
the verdict has been obtained through the fraud of the accused.
In other words, it is very plain that the one consideration of pub-
lic policy which outweighs all others is that the question of the
acquittal or immunity of one charged with crime, like the question
of his guilt, should not be regarded as settled until it has been
ascertained through the just and fair application through the
Courts of the rules and principles of law.
And if this is so, why is it not pertinent to ask whether the
same underlying principle of justice which demands a retrial
as against the accused because a juror is legally disqualified does
not equally demand a new trial when illegal evidence has been
admitted or excluded or fundamental principles of law: errone-
ously applied?
In State v. Lee,s Judge Hammersley, having emphatically
stated that there can be no sensible ground for distinction, goes
on to say:
"Before the verdict is returned, the trial court, of its own
motion, can award a retrial; after the verdict is returned, a re-
trial is awarded only on further proceedings in the cause which
may or may not be authorized by the law regulating procedure.
If such further proceedings are not authorized by law, the cause
is ended, and the one jeopardy of the accused is e xhausted; but
this results wot-from any special sanctity attributable to a verdict
tainted with illegality, but solely to the fact that the State, influ-
enced by considerations of public policy, has decided to make such
verdict, whether just or unjust, the end of that controversy. But
when the State sees fit to provide that the cause shall not neces-
sarily be so ended, but that farther proceedings on motion of the
accused may be had, an unjust verdict resumes its normal posi-
tion of a legal nullity; and when the State provides for like pro-
ceedings on the motion of the prosecutor, a similar result must
follow."
Thus it comes to be pretty clear that if the courts had con-
sidered this subject of appeals by the state upon the basis of
common sense and public welfare, they would have found it some-
what embarrassing to demonstrate that the administration of
criminal justice was best served by leaving untouched a verdict
of acquittal known by all competent observers to be a legal nullity,
and, in consequence, a miscarriage of justice. And so we find the
courts applying to this question of writs of error by the state to
Supra note 4, at 274, 30 Atl. at 1111.
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review verdicts of acquittal the test of an ancient dogma that in
reality carries with it no controlling reason whatsoever and
which, in its practical workings, defeats rather than promotes
the ends of justice. In other words, the maxim that no one shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense (which, in itg
origin and reason, properly means that a judicial proceeding
lawfully carried on to its conclusion by a final judgment ends the
controversies determined by that judgment) is converted into
the fallacious theory, having no basis in actual experience, that a
person accused of crime has a right of exemption from those
regulations of judicial procedure which the state deems necessary
to make the conduct and final result of that proceeding accord
with law.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1317, in dismissing an
appeal by the state under an acquittal of perjury, said:,
"A writ of error or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will
not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of the common
law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and
the same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxi-
ous to the Government might be harassed and run down, by
repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Be-
cause of this rule it is, that a new trial cannot be granted in a
criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error
will lie for the defendant but not against him. This is a rule
of such vital importance to the security of the citizen, that it
cannot be impaired but by express words and none such are used
in the statutes of this State."
Here, it seems, we have a perfect illustration of a preconceived
notion arbitrarily made to rest upon an accepted doctrine to
which it bears no relation at all. Who, in thinking in legal terms
of a civil action, would ever say that its issues had been twice
determined notwithstanding there had been a trial and verdict,
an appeal and a new trial and a second verdict. Would it not
be allowed without dispute that there had been but one deter-
mination of the issues and that the original case had never lost
its identity, no matter how many trials might have intervened,
until there had been accomplished in strict conformity with the
rules of law, a final, unassailable judgment? So, in a criminal
case, if a writ of error is not allowed to the state, it is not because
such a writ would involve "double jeopardy" to the accused, but
because the courts of the United States which, in so many other
subjects struck off completely and independently the shackles of
the English common law, in respect to criminal prosecutions were
unable to rid themselves of notions which were erroneously sup-
posed to be imbedded in the English practice. And returning
once more to the Tennessee case as a fair sample of this point of
view, it is now to be remarked that not only was the ancient
State v. Reynolds (1817, Tenn.) 4 Haywood, 110.
FORMER JEOPARDY
mandm of "double jeopardy" wholly inapplicable to the question
whether writs of error should be allowed against the accused;
but likewise the apprehension of persecution and tyranny which
was supposed to inspire the rule was wholly without foundation.
For in the State of Connecticut, and in many other states, by
constitutional amendment, or by statute where no constitutional
provision intervened, the state has been given the same right of
appeal in criminal cases as is given to the parties in civil actions;
and there seems to be no evidence that the rights and liberties
of persons unjustly accused of crime have been impaired or
threatened in consequence of the change.
As late as 1903, this identical question came before the Su-
preme Court of the United States, and 2.r. Justice Day, writing
the majority opinion, fell into that unsatisfactory line of reason-
ing which Judge Hammersley so relentlessly exposed in State e.
Lee.7 Referring to the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy, Justice Day said:
"At the common law, protection from second jeopardy for
the same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecu-
tion where the Court, having jurisdiction had acquitted the
accused of the offense. The rule is thus stated by Hawkins in
Pleas of the Crown . . . : 'The plea of former acquittal is
grounded on this maxim, that a man shall not be brought into
danger of his life for one and the same offense more than once.
From whence it is generally taken by all our books, as an un-
doubted consequence, that where a man has once been found
not guilty, on an indictment or appeal, free from error, and well
commenced before any Court which has jurisdiction of the cause,
he may, by the common law, in all cases, plead such acquittal in
bar of any subsequent indictment or appeal for the same
crime.' "
Now if you will look over the reports upon this subject, you
will find that our American judges seldom get far beyond some
such quotation as that employed by Justice Day. It is true, fir
reasons quite distinct from the theory of "double jeopardy", that
neither the state nor the accused in England was, until re-ent
times, permitted to trifle with a verdict, either of conviction or
of acquittal, through the means of an appeal. But granthij
this, it is still fair to ask by what possible interpretation M1r.
Hawkins can be said to have announced that the maxim of "double
jeopardy" would prevent a writ of error against an accumed vho
had been acquitted of crime.
In the United States case last referred to, the majority opinion
confidently states that both in England and in the United StateZ
the doctrine of former jeopardy has been universally held to
forbid the issuance of a writ of error against the accused; and
Supra note 5.
"Kepner v. United States, .supra note 1, at 126, 21 Sup. CL. at 803.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
yet three judges of that Court, dissenting, declare that they were
unable to find any authority for such a conclusion in any of the
cases cited by the majority opinion, Justice Holmes going on to
say:
"It is more pertinent to observe that it seems to me that, logi-
cally and rationally, a man cannot be said to be more than once
in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried.
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to
the end of the cause. Everybody agrees that the principle in its
origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a new and independent
case where a man already had been tried once. But there is no
rule that a man may not be tried twice in the same cause." 0
It is interesting to note that in the majority opinion, Justice
Day refers to Judge Hammersley's opinion in the Lee case as
follows:
"The case of State v. Lee, in the reasoning of the Court, seems
opposed to this view. But no reference is made in the course of
the opinion to any constitutional requirement in Connecticut as
to double jeopardy. An examination of the Constitution of that
State, and amendments as published in General Statutes of Con-
necticut, Revision of 1902, discloses no provision upon the subject
of jeopardy and we conclude there is none. The exceptional
character of the decision in State v. Lee is stated by the learned
editor of, American State Reports in the following language:
'This case, in its view of former jeopardy, stands out in bold re-
lief against the commonly understood meaning of what constitutes
once in jeopardy.'"
But if, as Judge Hammersley and Justice Holmes both so
logically demonstrate, there is nothing in the ancient rule against
double jeopardy which in any way modifies the universal view
of all judicial proceedings, that no particular proceeding can ever
be said to have terminated until a final judgment has been ren-
dered in accordance with law, then what possible bearing can
it have upon the question as to the right of the state to appeal
from a verdict of acquittal that the Constitution contains a pro-
vision against "double jeopardy"?
There is another, phase of the problem which is not without
mild interest. As our American law developed, it soon became
settled, either by judicial decision or by statute, that the accused
in a criminal case might, by appeal or writ of error from a verdict
of guilty, secure a new trial for errors of law appearing in the
record. It was not long after the first appearance of this privi-
lege in the United States before it occurred to a person who was
unquestionably guilty in a moral sense of a most atrocious crime,
that having, through the intricacies of the criminal law, secured
a reversal of a judgment of conviction and a new trial, it would
be a gross invasion of his natural and constitutional rights to be
9 Kepner v. United States, supra note 1, at 135, 24 Sup. Ct. at 806.
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again put in jeopardy of his precious life or limb. And so, the
courts have been compelled gravely to consider, and with no little
difficulty to conclude, that this was pushing the dicta of Hale and
Hawkins altogether too far. And yet it seems that the reasoning
of the courts upon this subject only further illustrates the original
misuse of the old maxim. Turn the thing as they would, the
judges could not get away from the fact that here, far more than
in most of the cases in which they had found no difficulty at all
in granting immunity to the guilty, the suppliant for sanctuary
was in very truth facing a "double jeopardy". He had been
tried once and by a close squeak had gotten away from it. And
now the law was making him face for the second time the peril
so lately avoided. And so the courts were moved to say that by
taking his appeal from the first conviction and asking for a new
trial, he had waived the constitutional guarantee against "double
jeopardy". 0 This sounds like good, plain common sense, al-
though it would have been much plainer and more satisfactory
sense to have said that there was no "double jeopardy" involved
at all. More satisfactory because the explanation that the ac-
cused had waived his constitutional guarantee at once calls to
mind those cases in which, despite the regrettable consequences
of their decisions, the courts have said over and over again that
these "fundamental guarantees of life and liberty" cannot be
waived.
And so, in the same Kepner case, Justice Holmes was moved to
remark as follows:
"If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the
Government, I believe it would be impossible to maintain that the
prisoner would be protected by the Constitution from being tried
again. He no more would be put in jeopardy a second time when
retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would
be when retried for a mistake that did him harm. It cannot
matter that the prisoner procures the second trial. In a capital
case, like Hopt v. People, a man cannot waive, and certainly will
not be taken to waive without meaning it, fundamental constitu-
tional rights. . . . Usually no such waiver is expressed or
thought of. Moreover, it cannot be imagined that the law would
deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error unless he should
waive other rights so importaut as to be saved by an express
clause in the Constitution of the United States." it
It seems impossible to read Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion
without asking oneself whether the critics of our criminal juris-
prudence are not fully justified in asking, in no very pleasant
mood, how it comes to pass that judges of our highest courts
have continued to set at liberty over and over again men guilty
of the most atrocious crimes because of slavish devotion to an
erroneous interpretation of a quaint and curious phrase extracted
20 Trono v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 521, 534, 20 Sup. Ct. 121, 124.
• Supra note 1, at 135, 24 Sup. Ct. at 806.
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from the old records of medieval lawyers. For it may be re-
peated that the imposing array of adjudications accumulated in
the records of criminal trials, for the most part exhibits striking
instances, not of the protection of the innocent, but of the regret-
table escape of the guilty.
Wherever one turns in the phases of this subject of "double
jeopardy", he encounters anew this queer consequence of the
misapplication of words. Thus the highest courts of New York,
and of several other states of authority in this country, have been
called upon to consider this proposition. An accused is charged
with murder in the first degree, and he is convicted of the lesser
crime of manslaughter. He appeals from that conviction and
secures a new trial. Being again brought to plea upon the charge
of murder in the first degree, he pleads his "double jeopardy";
he claims, and with unanswerable logic, that the jury by finding
him guilty of manslaughter found him not guilty of murder;
that he has once been in jeopardy of that dreadful crime and
now, under the Constitution, can only be tried for manslaughter.
And these courts have felt constrained to allow that plea, and to
decide that the second trial must be confined to the minor charge
of manslaughter.12  They have reached this conclusion, however,
not because they found it in harmony with principles of justice
or best suited to preserve the public welfare, but because in
times past they and their predecessors have given to the words
"former jeopardy" a meaning quite at variance with all concepts
of judicial procedure.
Such an attitude toward the administration of criminal justice,
it is respectfully submitted, can be productive of no good results,
and may perchance have exercigeda grave and deplorable influ-
ence in bringing to pass that attitude of contempt for law and the
apparent inefficiency of its criminal administration so painfully
regretted by all good citizens in tl~e present day and generation.
The point may be emphasized by reference to two cases which
you will encounter whenever you look up the subject of "double
jeopardy", but which, in themselves perhaps, are only loosely
related to the subject.
In 1875, one Kring committed murder in the State of Missouri.
The proceedings taken to establish hi4 guilt and impose the penal-
ties prescribed by law are thus summarized in the opening para-
graph of the opinion in the Supreme Court of the United States
when the case eventually reached that tribunal. 13
"The plaintiff in error was indicted in the Criminal Court of
St. Louis for murder in the first degree, charged to have been
committed January 4, 1875, to which he pleaded: not guilty.
He has been tried four times before a jury, and sentenced once
12 People v. Dowling (1881) 84 N. Y. 478, 483.
13 Kring v. Missouri (1882) 107 U. S. 221, 2 Sup. Ct. 443.
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on a plea of guilty of murder in the second degree. His cae
has been three times before the Court of Appeals of that State
and three times before the Supreme Court of the State. In the
last instance, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Criminal Court by which he was found guilty of murder in the
first degree and sentenced to be hung, and it is to this judgment
that the present writ of error is directed."
It appears that by the law of Missouri in force when the homi-
cide was committed, a conviction upon the charge of murder of a
lesser degree was construed as an acquittal of the higher degree
of murder. When Kring was first brought to trial, however,
this rule of law had been changed by a constitutional enactment.
Kring then, upon the first trial, being charged vwith murder in
the first degree, pleaded guilty to the charge of murder in the
second degree and was sentenced to imprisonment. Having
pleaded guilty, he then prosecuted an appeal and succeeded, for
some reason or other, in getting a new trial. Having been again,
convicted, he was once more, through the merciful intervention
of the law, granted a third trial. Upon the third trial, he wai
convicted of murder in the first degree. He then prosecut l
another appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri and from
that Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, claiming
that under the law as it existed at the time of the homicide, his
plea of guilty of murder in the second degree would have been
equivalent to a conviction of murder in the second degree, and
that a conviction of murder in the second degree would have
been equivalent to an acquittal of the charge of murder in the
first degree; that although at the time he pleaded guilty to murd.r
in the second degree, this rule of law had been abrogated by
constitutional amendment, yet as against him the constitutional
amendment was ex post facto and therefore inapplicable. He
must, therefore, be held by his plea of guilty of murder in the
second degree to have been acquitted of the charge of murder
in the first degree, and that notvithstanding he had himself, by
writ of error, asked and obtained a new trial, he ought not to
have been put to trial upon the charge of murder in thd first
degree because thereby he was twice put in jeopardy. The Su-
preme Court of the United States decided that these claims were
so securely founded in the principles of law and justice that there
must be a new trial. In consequence, the last verdict was set
aside and the cause was sent back to Mlissouri with instructions
to the public authorities of that State to begin once more where
they had begun seven years before to bring this murderer to
justice.
It is, of course, true that "double jeopardy" plays but a small
part in this miscarriage of justice. But it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the Court applied the doctrine of ex post facto in the
same narrow and harmful spirit as characterized the interpreta-
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tion of the words "double jeopardy" in other cases. It is note-
worthy in the Kring case that three justices dissented, and in
their dissenting opinion have gathered instances of laws claimed
to be ex post facto materially affecting and altering the condition
of men charged with crime, which were declared by the courts
not to be within the constitutional prohibition. It is difficult to
read the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion without
being stirred by the uneasy feeling that the majority of the judges
of the Supreme Court were moved to render their decision in the
Kring case because they were still unconsciously held in the
thralldom of the fear of royal tyranny which, like an infection,
was brought to our shores with the importation of the English
common law.
The other case which is closely linked with the constitutional
doctrine of double jeopardy, is Hopt v. People of Utah.14 Some
time about the year 1880, Frederick Hopt committed a cruel and
atrocious murder. In the whole wretched story, there was noth-
ing to throw any reasonable doubt upon the guilt of Hopt, nor
was there anything in the circumstances that mitigated the nat-
ural horror of the crime or awakened for the accused any senti-
ment, however misguided, of sympathy or regret. He was
brought to trial and convicted. He brought his writ of error
to the Supreme Court of the United States and there it was dis-
covered that a statute of the State of Utah required that the
instructions of the court to the jury must be reduced to writing,
notwithstanding which in this trial, one of the paragraphs of the
charge, consisting of a quotation from a law magazine, was not
otherwise incorporated in the written instructions than by refer-
ence to the volume and page of that magazine. In the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the United States, this omission was
fatal; and it was ordered that the trial of Hopt begin again. It
did begin and resulted very speedily in another conviction of
murder in the first degree. Again Hopt brought his record to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and there it was dis-
covered that in his charge to the jury, the court had used these
words:
"That an atrocious and dastardly murder has been committed
by some person is apparent, but in your deliberations you should
be careful not to be influenced by any feeling."
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, this constituted an inva-
sion of the right of the jury to determine the degree of the
murder, notwithstanding the Court had expressly stated to the
jury that it was for them, and for them alone, to determine with
what degree of murder the accused, if found guilty at all, should
be convicted. The Court also found another error which is very
14 (1881) 104 U. S. 631; (1884) 110 U. S. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. 202; (1885) 114
U. S. 488, 5 Sup. Ct. 972; (1886) 120 U. S. 430, 7 Sup. Ct. 614.
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significant in view of the ultimate disposition of this case. It
appeared that under the law of Utah, where a talesman was
challenged by the defense for prejudice, it was the duty of the
Court to select three disinterested persons who should examine
the challenged talesman and report to the Court whether there
was any foundation for the challenge. With respect to four of
the talesmen who sat upon the jury, there were peremptory
challenges by the accused and triers were duly appointed. By
direction of the Court and without objection from counsel for
the defense, the triers stepped into an adjoining room and, having
performed their duties, returned and reported to the Court that
there was no basis for the challenge for prejudice. No further
objection was made by the accused against these talesmen and
no exception taken to the procedure followed. But the Supreme
Court of the United States, upon the second appeal, decided that
the examination of the talesmen by the triers not in the presence
of the accused, was a violation of constitutional rights, and that
neither expressly nor by implication could he be said to have
waived so fundamental a guarantee of liberty. In consequence
of this, the people of Utah were directed once more to begin their
efforts to bring this villain to justice. A third time he was put
to trial and promptly convicted of murder in the first degree,
and again sentenced to be hanged. And again he brought his
record to the Supreme Court of the United States. And on this
occasion, it was discovered that the clerk, after conviction, in
making up the record, failed to state whether or not the judge's
charge was written or oral. And since the law required the
charge to be reduced to writing before delivery in the absence
of an agreement by both parties that it be oral, the Court was
unable to determine, either that the charge was written or, if
oral, that there had been an agreement to that effect. Again
the Supreme Court decided, although by this time two justices
were in vigorous dissent, that no man should be hanged upon such
a record as that; and for the fourth time the people of Utah
were directed to resume their efforts to see that the majesty
of the law was upheld. The fourth trial resulted in conviction
and again Hopt brought his record to the Supreme Court, con-
fident no doubt that he was secure in his apparent right of sanctu-
ary. But nothing that his counsel could find in the record upon
which to base a claim of error proved of any avail on this fourth
appeal. The defense of "former jeopardy" was not even argued.
By counsel and court it seems to have been tacitly assumed that
Hopt had waived the constitutional guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment against being twice put in jeopardy of his life for the
same offense. And so by a curious twist of fate, Hopt v. People
of Utah appears, in all discussions upon the subject, as final
authority for the proposition that one who secures a retrial after
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a verdict of guilty cannot plead the first conviction in bar of a
second prosecution, notwithstanding that nowhere in the course
of the whole proceeding was the claim of "former jeopardy"
raised by counsel for the defense, and notwithstanding that in
the second review of the case by the Supreme Court of the United
States, it was solemnly declared that even a statutory require-
ment as to the procedure to be followed in the trial of a capital
case could not be waived by the accused.
It may well be that in the day and time of this famous litiga-
tion, the principles applied and the result accomplished may have
been useful or, at least, inevitable steps in the orderly develop-
ment of our criminal jurisprudence. But viewed as a record of
the past, it seems to suggest only this mournful reflection, that
it was in the Summer of 1880 that Hopt committed the crime of
murder; and it was about Easter 1887 that the disquieting record
was finally closed.
If these two cases stood alone, they would be of little conse-
quence. But it is obvious that they could not stand alone. Two
cases presenting the best thought and learning of men constitut-
ing the highest judicial tribunal in this country cannot be lightly
set aside or disregarded. If these cases are travesties upon jus-
tice, it is because there is something inherent in our system of
criminal administration which of necessity compelled the result
which we are tempted to deplore. The fact is that these cases
could be duplicated over and over again until one must neces-
sarily return to the conclusion with which this discussion was
begun, namely, that for the last hundred years by far the greater
number of cases in the courts of last resort in this country, in so
far as they apply to the administration of criminal justice, repre-
sent the employment of the best talents of advocacy and the
greatest learning of jurists, not in saving the innocent from un-
just conviction, but in making possible the escape or difficult the
conviction of the guilty. All the lectures upon the beauties of
the Constitution and the virtues of American citizenship, all the
pictures of the evil consequences of crime, all the exhortations to
law and order, all the examples of severity in the punishment of
convicted criminals will go for nothing so long as we continue to
maintain and build up a jurisprudence of criminal law which, as
administered in the courts of last resort, serves no other purpose
than to hinder or delay conviction of guilt.
It seems evident we must abandon the notion that there can
be no swift and certain pursuit and punishment of the guilty
consistent with the preservation of civil liberties. That is a doc-
trine born of conditions which ceased to exist more than a century
ago. It reflects a fear that persists long after its cause has been
removed from practical human affairs.
One hundred years ago, our fathers in the law seemed com-
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pelled, particularly in criminal cases, to attempt to find in legal
records even then long since forgotten and covered with dust the
answer to problems presented on appeal. In the second of Day's
reports appended to the case of State v. Woodruff," is a reprint
of Judge Kent's opinion in the case of People e. Olcott. This
opinion is regarded as a classic. It re-appears in almost every
discussion of the law of former jeopardy. The problem which
Judge Kent had to decide was whether or not a rascal who bad
unquestionably committed a vicious fraud could be brought to
trial by reason of the circumstance that at an earlier trial a jury,
obviously disrupted by improper prejudices, had been unable to
reach an agreement upon a verdict and had been discharged.
It was the claim of counsel that here was a case of double jeop-
ardy. If Judge Kent had tackled the problem as did Judge Ham-
mersley in Connecticut and Justice Holmes in Washington, he
would have dismissed the plea upon the ground that there could
have been no jeopardy until the prosecution had been brought to
a final judgment consistent with law. But instead of that, le
went searching through the ancient, dusty tomes of the English
juristic writings to find authority for the proposition that a
situation such as this should be treated as an exception to the
rule against double jeopardy. Going back to times wholly unlike
the conditions under which he lived, the learned justice dug up
and brought to light all manner of ancient and curious instances
of complications arising in the workings of a crude and primitive
jury system, none of which could have the slightest bearing upon
the necessities of the times in which the authorities of New York
were attempting to prosecute and punish offenses against the
law. And it is curious to note that Judge Kent's doubts a,, to
what should be the ruling of the court upon the mooted problem,
were not finally resolved in favor of the State until he chanced
to hit upon a bit of legal learning that is thus reported in his
opinion. I quote from him as follows:
"There is an opinion given in an ancient book of approved
authority, The Doctor and Student, Dial 2, Chapter 53, page 272,
which comes up fully to the case before the Court. In answer
to the fifth question of the Doctor, whether it stand with con-
science to prohibit a jury of meat and drink until they be agreed,
the learned author St. Germain, puts this answer into the mouth
of the Student: 'That if the case happened, that the jury can in
no wise agree in their verdict, and that appeareth to the Justices
by examination, the Justices may, in that case, suffer them to
have both meat and drink for a time, to see whether they will
agree; and if they will in no wise agree, I think (continues the
Student) that the Justices may take such order in the matter as
may seem to them, by their discretion, to stand with reason and
conscience, by awarding of a new inquest and by setting a fine
1 Supra note 3.
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upon them, that they find in default, or otherwise as they shall
think best by their discretion, like as they may do if one of thejury die before verdict or if any like casualties fall in that
behalf.'
It so happens that in that case, Judge Kent arrived at a con-
clusion which has since commended itself to most courts. But
we of the twentieth century can have little hope of a system of
criminal jurisprudence whose interpretation is still guided and
governed by considerations drawn from the Middle Ages; and it
is most seriously to be considered whether the fault dtes not lie
in applying to criminal records upon review, as between the
State and the accused, the same tests as are applied in the records
of civil cases upon appeal where, for all practical purposes, purely
private interests are involved. It is wise and necessary, and for
the simple reason that no better way has ever been discovered,
that the determination of civil controversies shall be made in
strict conformity with rules of law and procedure no matter how
technical and finely drawn they may become in the intensity of
legal conflict. So far as appears, however unsatisfactory may be
the results of civil litigation when tested by the desired end of
abstract justice, none the less we adhere to our rules and dis-
tinctions because we have not yet found any way to get rid of
them. But when we turn to criminal prosecutions and insist
that a conviction must be set aside because of some formal or
technical default in the record made up by the parties concerned,
we are forced to admit that when the thing is carried to the extent
to which it has been carried in this country in the last hundred
years, it defeats its own purpose. We have a system which, in
many of its most cumbersome and burdensome features, serves
in no wise to protect the innocent against unjust accusation but
does serve, in an astonishing degree, to prevent, or at least make
extremely difficult, the prosecution of those who, for all practical
purposes, are known to be guilty of crime.
If, in the years to come, the method of calm judicial inquiry
gives way to indiscriminate fury, or the machinery of law is
employed with cold malignity to trap and destroy the innocent,
it will not be because to-day we sweep aside the precepts and
precedents of an old r6gime, but rather because by unreasoning
devotion to them we weaken the forces which make for law and
order, forgetful that when these forces are no longer in the as-
cendant, forms and precepts lend themselves as readily to deeds
of wickedness as once they were supposed to inspire acts of
righteousness. Law and all its institutions will surely collapse
when they are beaten upon from one side by waves of crime and
battered on the other by surges of exasperated and outraged
Justice.
